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If we dismiss, as indefensible, the middle or compromise
view suggested by some portions of the opinion of Farwell, L. J.,
(indorsed by Lord Atkinson and Lord Gorell), What choice shall
be made between the general view taken by Lords Alverstone,
Loreburn and Shaw, and that advocated by Moulton, L. J.?
How much force and effect is now to be allowed to the old
talk about "malice" and "implied malice"? Do the former ideas
as to those phrases still possess sufficient vitality to justify the
Moulton view? This inquiry has been effectively answered in
the negative by so many jurists that space cannot be found here
for a full quotation of all their utterances. It must suffice to
present only a few criticisms of the doctrines underlying the
Moulton view as to these phrases.'
"Why is it not as simple to say the speaking defamatory matter
without legal excuse is actionable as it is to say defamatory matter
to be actionable must be malicious, but the law implies the malice?
*Continued from 6o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 365
(March, 1912).
'"It may seem like 'slaying the slain' to cite authorities on these points,
but . . . the old heresies still occasionally break out, and, indeed, underlie
the even now uniform habit of pleading malice in the statement of claim ..
Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, 27r.
Some of the statements hereinafter quoted in the text were made by
way of comment on the often cited opinion of Bayley, J., in Bromage v.
(461)
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NN hat need is there of bringing into the law of slander the cumbrous
machinery of malice for the sole purpose of necessitating the con-
stiuction of other madhinery,--the machinery of legal implica-
tion,-to take it out again? If legal malice means the want of legal
excuse, which appears to be the most approved definition of it, then
it means so much that it means nothing, for in that sense every act
which is ground-work of an action is malice. In other words,
malice is an ingredient of every action at law as much as it is of
slander, and it is because money is maliciously retained, that is,
that it is retained without legal excuse, that the plaintiff can main-
tain assumpsit." 2
"They" (the courts of law) "affirmed that malice was in all
cases necessary to maintain the action, and to find a malice which
did not exist they implied it. They were like men who should per-
sist in viewing all things through smoked glass, and should light
candles to enable them to see through the glass; if they should remove
the glass they would save their candles and see at least as clearly
as before. The whole doctrine of legal malice is pure scholasticism
and obscures with a thick fog everything it envelops." 3
Mr. Street says: "In Bromatge v. Prosser the notion that
malice is the gist of the action "was taken up With muqh show of
learning and made into a man of straw only to be demolished.
one legal fiction was set up. only to be demolished by
another legal fiction."'4  "The legal fiction that malice is essential
to the action is destroyed by the fiction that thenecessary malice
will be presumed."
'5
Mr. Odgers states his position in his main treatise on Libel
and Slander; but gives his views more fully in his admirable
Six Lectures on the Law of Libel, delivered in the Middle Temple
Hall in 1896, and published under the title: "An Outline of the
Law of Libel." Some extracts are here given:
Prosser, 4 Barn. & Cress, .247, A. D. 1825. In that case the court held that
proof of malice in fact was not requited in an action for defamation. But
they undertook to distinguish between -two kinds of malice, malice in fact
and malice in law. They seem to hold that malice, in some sense, is the gist
of the action; but that the law implies such malice as is necessary to make a
prima facie case.- Bayley, J., said: "Malice in common acceptation means ill
will against a person, but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act, done
intentionally, without just cause or excuse."
- 'N. St. John, Green, 6 Am. Law Rev. 597.
3Ibid, 6og-61o.
1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 317.
". .. these two useless fictions, the one laughing at and offsetting the
other . . ." Gaynor, J., in Prince v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 N. Y. Misc.
186, p. 188, A. D. i896.
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"The malice which the law is said to presume from the pub-
lication of defamatory words is something quite different from
the malice which the plaintiff must prove in order to rebut the
defence of privilege. One is 'malice in law'-a fiction: the other
is malice in fact. Let us forget the fiction and stick to the fact." e
Our older judges and text-book writers "will have it that malice
is the gist of the action-which is obviously false. Then, having
told that falsehood, they are met with the fact that no plaintiff ever
yet was nonsuited in an action of libel because he had not proved
malice, except where the occasion was one of qualified privilege;
and also with the further fact that in three reported cases the jury
expressly found that there was no malice on the part of the defend-
ant, and yet the plaintiff recovered damages. To get over this, they
invent another falsehood, that the law presumes malice from the
mere fact that the defendant has published words defamatory of the
plaintiff. The law presumes nothing of the kind; for it knows that
half the libels published are published carelessly, accidentally, inad-
vertently, or mistakenly, with an entire absence of all malice on the
part of the defendant." 7
(Then, after stating the decision in favor of the plaintiff in
Shepheard v. Whitaker," the learned author continues): "But it is
preposterous to say that the law presumed malice in such a case
as this. I can only echo Mr. Bumble: 'If the law supposes that,
the law is an ass.'" 9
"It is just what I was taught as a boy-how one lie leads to
another."
"Let us get rid of all these antiquated attempts to make our
law presume something which is contrary to the obvious facts of
the case. The law never presumes actual malice, and that is the
only kind of malice worth presuming. Unless the judge rules that
the occasion is privileged, no question as to malice is ever left to
the jury; the plaintiff will recover damages if he proves that his
reputation has been injured by the defendant, whether such injury
was malicious or accidental." 10
'Page i2.
'Pages 112, 113.
3 L. R. io Com. Pl. 5o2.
'Page 114.
"0Page ix6. See also Markby, Elements of Law, 3rd Ed., Section 687;
Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, 271, 273, 153, note (n) ;
17 Law Quarterly Review, 391; Bigelow, Torts, 7th ed., Sections 319, 38, 39;
4 Columbia Law Review, 37, note 3; 2 Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evi-
dence, Section 1164; Goode, J., in Farley v. Evening Chronicle Publishing
Co., I13 Missouri Appeals, 216, pp. 226, 227; Gaynor, J., in Ulrich v. New
York Press Co., 23 N. Y. Misc. i68, 171-172.
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Assuming, as I do, that the views expressed in the fore-
going quotations are correct, how can one account for the fact
that some able jurists still cling to the old phraseology, and do
not in terms (and sometimes, indeed, do not in fact) recognize
that the substantive law has been altered and that misleading
fictions should be thrown aside?
Two reasons stand out prominently.
First: The general custom of retaining the word "malic-
iously," in the declaration.
Second (and more important): The failure of judges to
frankly admit that the substantive law is being changed by their
decisions; and their use of "fiction phrases" to conceal the fact
of such change.
As to the first reason:
The retention of the word "maliciously" in the declaration,
though now unnecessary, tends to induce a mistaken belief that
it represents a material requisite of the action. 1
S. . Mr. Bower says that illogical and inexact practices
in pleading tend, first to encourage, and then to perpetuate false
doctrines as to the substantive principles of the law
And he gives, as one instance, the practice of averring malice
in the statement of claim in defamation suits.
12
As to the reason why the word maliciously is still inserted
in almost every declaration for defamation.
Sir Henry Maine, I believe, has somewhere said that "legal
phraseology is the part of the law which is the last to alter." He
might have added that the part of legal phraseology which is
the last to alter is the language commonly used in declarations.
There has been a "tendency of judges to follow pleaders instead
of insisting that pleaders shall follow them.13
ISee Daly, J., in Viele v. Gray, io Abbott's Practice Reports, New
York, i, p. 6, A. D. 1859.
" Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, 49o.
" Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, 272.
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Counsel, who is drawing a declaration for defamation,
knows that if he inserts an allegation that the publication was
"malicious" he does not thereby place himself under obligation
to prove the existence of malice. And he also knows that his
insertion of this allegation does not confer upon the defendant
the right to defeat the action by disproving the existence of
malice. But, if he omits this allegation, it is not improbable that
the defendant may demur; and, though the demurrer may ulti-
mately be overruled, yet delay and expense are thereby occasioned.
Counsel reasons that the insertion of this allegation can do his
client no harm, and hence he 'follows the old custom and inserts
it. Mr. Odgers retains the words "falsely and maliciously" in
his suggested forms of declaration; 14 and advises their inser-
tion, saying: "This is a time-honored phrase which appears in
every Statement of Claim; and it would be foolish to idly raise
a point of law by omitting it, though in the present day its omis-
sion would probably not be a fatal defect." 15
But, in addition to the effect of retaining the word "malic-
iously" in the declaration, there is a second, and more influential,
reason why so many lawyers still labor under a fundamental mis-
take as to the present state of the law on this topic. This reason
is to be found in the failure of judges to frankly admit that the
substantive law is being changed by their decisions, and in their
use of "fiction phrases" to conceal the fact of such change. Judges
"are for the most part persons of a conservative disposition."
"Page 748, et seq.
"Page 625. The learned author adds: "There is, however, a practical
convenience in alleging malice in the Statement of Claim, viz., if the defend-
ant pleads privilege, no special reply is then necessary; the formal averment
in the Statement of Claim takes new meaning, and becomes an allegation of
express malice." Odgers on Libel and Slander, 5th ed., 625.
Mr. Odgers is a very high authority on pleading as well as on defama-
tion. But, if the question were a new one, I should doubt whether an aver-
ment in a declaration which, when originally inserted, bears a particular
meaning or no meaning at all, can change its meaning or acquire a meaning
in consequence of the defendants setting up a particular defence. In his
outline of the Law of Libel, page 112, Mr. Odgers has correctly said: "The
malice which the law is said to presume from the publication of defamatory
words is something quite different from the malice which the plaintiff must
prove in order to rebut the defence of privilege. One is 'malice in law'-
a fiction; the other is 'malice in fact.'"
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Many of them profess to believe that they have no right "to
make law." And all of them are aware of the popular notion
that a judge who "makes law" is thereby usurping the functions
of the legislature.'
As might be expected, judges are very slow to consciously
change the law, and are reluctant to acknowledge the full scope
of changes actually effected by their decisions. And even when
they do, more or less clearly, recognize the fact of change, there
is a frequent tendency to veil the reality under the fiction that
they are merely laying down a rule of evidence.'
7
Sir William Markby, after exposing the absurdity of the
present use of the phrase "malice in law," says:
"Any one acquainted with the history of English law knows
exactly how this has occurred.' To have said that malice, or fraud,
or notice, were not necessary, in cases where they had been gener-
ally thought necessary, would have been too much like an avowed
innovation. For though it is, as I have shown above, a duty imposed
upon English judges, within certain limits, to make new laws, it is
against the tradition of their office ever to avow it. By saying, there-
fore, that there is malice in law, or fraud in law, they pretend that
there is malice, or fraud, or whatever else they think unnecessary,
when there is really none at all." 's
Sir William Markby's view-that the above criticised
method of expression is indefensible--can be met only by taking
one or the other of the two following positions:
"The people who entertain this prejudice against "judge-made law" are
generally unaware that a large part of the law under which they are living is
of that description--"that is to say, consists of rules to be collected from the
judgments of the court. This portion of the law has not been created by
Act of Parliament, and is not recorded in the statute book. It is the work
of the courts; it is recorded in the Reports; it is, in short, the fruit of
judicial legislation. . . . Nine-tenths, at least of the law of contract, and
the whole, or nearly the whole, of the law of torts are not to be discovered
in any volume of the statutes."
Dicey on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion, pp. 359, 36o.
See also pp. 484, 490, 492.
"For criticism of the term "conclusive presumption," and of its use to
enable the court to lay down a new rule of substantive law under the guise
of a rule of evidence, see 1 Austin, Jurisprudence, 3rd ed., 508, 5o9; Gray,
Nature and Sources of. the Law, Section 228; 4 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec-
tion 2492; 2 Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence, Sections 1145, 1146,
1149, ii6o. '
'Markby, Elements of Law, 3rd ed., Section 688. And compare 2
Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence, Section 1164, and note 4.
"But I now employ the expression 'Legal Fiction' to signify any assump-
tion which conceals or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has
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i. That judges do not, by their decisions, make changes
in substantive law.
2. That the use of legal fictions is beneficial, instead of per-
nicious.
Both these propositions seem to the. present writer unten-
able; but it is impossible to discuss them here. As to whether
judges make law, some important conflicting authorities are col-
lected in Professor Wambaugh's Study of Cases. 19 Since the
publication of that book, ,the subject has been quite fully discussed
by three eminent jurists, who arriv6 at three different conclusions.
These writers are: Mr. James C. Carter, one of the greatest law-
yers of his day, whose views are found in his posthumously pub-
lished work, "Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function;" Prof. A.
V. Dicey, in "The Relation Between Law and Public Opinion
in England ;-120 Prof. John C. Gray, in "The Nature and Sources
of the Law."
'2 1
I prefer the view taken by Prof. Gray: That judges can
and do make changes in substantive law.
If, in view of the foregoing reasoning, one throws aside
all "fiction phrases," and adopts the general views stated in the
opinions of Lords Alverstone, Loreburn and Shaw, what are
the fundamental principles underlying those opinions; how far
is the right to reputation protected by law ? 22
undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being
modified." (Then, after referring to the English Case-law and the Roman
Responsa Prudentum as resting on fictions) : "The fact is in both cases that
the law has been wholly changed; the fiction is that it remains what it always
was." Maine's Ancient Law, Ist ed., 26.
So one of Bentham's most distinguished disciples, instead of joining in
his master's denunciation of "judge-made law," says: "Notwithstanding my
great admiration for Mr. Bentham, I cannot but think that, instead of blam-
ing judges for having legislated, he should blame them for the timid, nar-
row and piecemeal manner in which they have legislated, and for legislating
under cover of vague and indeterminate phrases, . . " I Austin, Jurispru-
dence, 3rd ed., 224. And again: "He" (the judge) "is to be blamed com-
monly, not for innovation, but for working it under false pretences, and
without system." 2 Austin, 1O29.
"2nd ed., Section 78, note 2.
Chapter XI, and more fully in the Appendix, pp. 481-493.
'1 Sections 215-231, 465-512, 545-550, 628-636.
"In.the statements about to be made, it is assumed that damage has
resulted from the publication; and there is no consideration of the ques-
tion, what can be shown in mitigation of damage.
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RIGHT TO REPUTATION.
Every person has an absolute right against all other persons
(except such as are hereinafter specified) that his reputation shall
not be impaired by the publication of charges which are defama-
tory in their nature.
23
This right exists against all persons except-
(I) Those who (allege and) prove the truth of the
charges;
(2) Those who publish the charges on an absolutely
privileged occasion;
(3) Those who publish the charges on a conditionally
privileged occasion (providing, however, that
the conditions of the privilege other than the
occasion) are not rebutted by plaintiff.
'The existence of such an "absolute right" is fully recognized by Sir
Frederick Pollock, although he evidently entertains some doubt as to its
beneficial operation.
"Generally speaking, there is no such thing as liability for negligence
in word as distinguished from act; and this difference is founded in the
nature of the thing."
Note (x) : "The law of defamation stands apart; but it is no exception to
the proposition in the text, for it is not a law requiring care and caution in
greater or less degree, but a law of absolute responsibility qualified by abso-
lute exceptions; and where malice has to be proved, the grossest negligence
is only evidence of malice." Pollock on Torts, 6th ed., 534.
The common law presents-... (2) an artificial theory of
malice, now reduced in effect to the doctrine that, exceptions excepted, a man
acts at his peril in making defamatory communications." Draft of Indian
Civil Wrongs Bill. Preliminary note to Chapter IV on Defamation. Pollock
on Torts, 6th ed., pp. 591, 592.
.... the principle of the common law that, certain occasions ex-
cepted . . . . a man defames his neighbor at his peril. It may seem a hard
rule, but it is now well settled in England. . . ." Ibid, note (1), p. 597.
"It is a wrong to damage one's neighbor by deceit, but there is not any
absolute right not to be deceived in the sense in which there is an absolute
right not to be defamed. This last-mentioned right is itself of comparatively
recent origin, and is something of an anomaly in English law. Perhaps it
may be a fair subject of discussion whether it be on the whole a beneficial
one either at home or in British India." Pollock, Law of Fraud in British
India-Tagore Law Lectures, A. D. 1894. Pages 22, 23.
Judge Cooley, in discussing "the necessary ingredients" of actionable de-
famation, says:
"In many cases of aggravated injury, there is really no malice at all, and
no intent to injure; at most, there is only thoughtlessness or negligence; ...
Sometimes there is not even negligence; . . . One may be excused in morals
and yet not in law; . .. "
Cooley on Torts, ist ed., 209; 2nd ed., 245.
So Dr. Bishop's general formula does not include the elements of wrong
motive, wrong intent, or negligence.
"He who, not in pursuance of any interest of his own, and neither in
obedience to the law nor in the discharge of any public or private duty, so
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With the exception of the above three classes, all persons
publishing defamatory charges do so at their peril.
They are not exonerated:
by proving their honest and reasonable belief in the truth
of the charges;
or by proving entire absence of wrong motive;
or by proving the presence of a morally justifiable motive;
or by proving entire absence of intention to defame;
or by proving that the form in which the charge was made
was due to mistake in publication; even a non-negligent
mistake.
Negligence is not an element in the tort of defamation.
Plaintiff need not prove defendant careless.
Defendant does not exonerate himself by proving that he
was careful.
24
The question may be asked: What "wrong" has the defend-
ant in Jones v. Hulton done; what "duty" has he violated ? 25
It may be that he has done no "wrong" in the popular sense
of the term. The "duty" which he has violated is an absolute
or peremptory duty, a duty unqualified in its nature, a duty to
refrain at his peril from the doing of certain acts, a duty which
may be violated by conduct entirely free from moral blame-
worthiness.
The cases where the law allows a remedy in the form of
an action of tort may be classified as follows:
i. Intentional wrongdoing.
2. Negligent wrongdoing.
employs any words or signs as to injure another in a way and degree cog-
nizable by the law. is liable to him in damages."
Bishop, Non-Contract Law, Section 253.
i "..n . . The whole law of defamation is inconsistent with any applica-
tion of the law of negligence to either spoken or written words, .. '
Prof. Williston in 24 Harv. Law Rev., 436.
In one instance a question of negligence might be material, for a col-
lateral purpose. Some states hold that a plaintiff may rebut the defence of
conditional privilege by proving that defendant, although honestly believing
his charge, had no reasonable ground for entertaining such belief. On that
issue a question might arise, whether defendant took reasonable care to
ascertain the truth of the charge.
"See 58 Univ. Pa. Law Review, pp. 168 and 5IO.
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3. An exceptional class of cases, where a man is held
to act at his peril; and, if damage ensues, is
absolutely liable, entirely irrespective of fault .2
Among the cases embraced in Class 3 are: entry upon land
of another, or assumption of dominion over the chattel of another,
under an honest and non-negligent mistake as to the title; entry
of cattle upon another's land without fault on the part of the
owner of the cattle; making certain extra-hazardous uses of one's
own property.
-2 7
At an early day, in actions for physical damage to the per-
son or to tangible objects of property, culpability was not a re-
quisite to the action. If the defendant did the physical act which
damaged the plaintiff, he was held liable, even though he were
absolutely free from fault.2 8  A great change in the law has
gradually taken place. As a general rule, in cases 6f physical
damage, culpability is now essential to an action. This general
rule is, however, subject to certain large exceptions where, on
grounds of -public policy, the rule of absolute liability is en-
forced.
29
But while the judicial movement, in cases of physical dam-
age, has been from imposing absolute liability toward requiring
culpability, the movement as to defamation has been the reverse.
In early times, wrong intent or wrong motive was considered
necessary to a recovery for defamation. This, as has been ex-
plained, was largely due to the theory as to the basis of jurisdic-
tion in the ecclesiastical courts, at a time when the highest
secular courts did not entertain suits for defamation. After the
'As to Class 3, see Pollock, Torts, 6th ed., 7-16; Clerk & Lindsell,
Torts, 2d ed., iI; Salmond, Torts, Ist ed., 11-14. As to different modes of
stating the obligation or liability, see Markby, Elements of Law, 3rd ed.,
Section 693; Salmond on Jurisprudence, Ed. of 1902, 456, 457.
"Some able jurists question the policy, which now prevails, of imposing
absolute liability in the case of extra-hazardous uses. They would prefer to
require only due care under the circumstances, s. e., care proportioned to the
apparent risk; a rule which would often, as matter of fact, require great
care. See Pollock, Torts, 6th ed., 467-8, 473, 623-4; I Street, Foundations of
Legal Liability, 84, 85.
'See Prof. Ames, 22 Harv. Law Rev. 99; Prof. Wigmore, 7 Harv. Law
Rev. 317.
" I am speaking here 6f the law as laid down by the courts. While, how-
ever, the tendency of modern judges has been to restrict or deny liability in
the absence of negligence or wrongful intention, the tendency of modern
legislatures is to impose liability upon the owner 6f a business irrespective
of fault on his part.
JONES v. HULTON
higher secular courts took jurisdiction of such suits, they gradu-
ally came to regard wrong mental attitude as unessential, and,
by their decisions on various points, practically treated the action
for defamation as belonging under Class 3, ante; where a defend-
ant does certain acts at his peril.
Assuming the foregoing statement to represent the present
general rule of law as to defamation, does justice require that
the general rule should be changed; or, if no change is made
in the general rule, should the present case of Jones v. Hulton
be held to constitute an exception tb the application of the gen-
eral rule?
Should the general rule as to defamation be changed, so
as to correspond to the modem law which is applied in the
majority of suits for physical damage to person or property?
At the present time, in a large proportion of cases of unin-
tended physical damage to person or property, a defendant is
not held liable unless he were negligent. If, for example, in
the carrying on of traffic on the highway, or in building a house,
or in erecting a division fence, unintended damage results from
the defendant's conduct, there is, according to the better Ameri-
can view, no liability in the absence of negligence. This modern
doctrine is supported on the ground that it is for the general
interest of the community that traffic and building operations
should be carried on; and that the imposition of absolute lia-
bility upon the doer would tend to discourage the doing of these
acts.3 0
It seems clear that the reasons given for the milder rule
in the case of highway traffic or building operations do not apply
to defamation. The utterance of charges which are not true in
fact and are defamatory in their nature is not essential to the
progress of the community in comfort or civilization, nor does
it generally tend to promote the public welfare. In some excep-
tional situations where it is for the general welfare, or is reason-
ably requisite for the protection of private interests, that men
should feel free to make statements which are prima facie defama-
tory, the law affords protection, absolute or conditional. But
"0 See Holmes, ., in Quinn v.'Crimmihgs, 171 Mass. 255, p. 258; Doe, J.,
in Brown v. Collins, 53 New Hampshire, 442, pp. 448, 45o,
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outside of these exceptional classes I believe that more harm than
good would result from making proof of negligence a requisite
to the plaintiff's prima facie case, or from allowing to the
defendant the defence of carefulness.
31
If there is no sufficient cause for making a change in the
general law of defamation as to the points above discussed, is
there a sufficient reason for constituting Jones v. Hulton an
exception to the general rule? Would such injustice result from
applying the general rule to the facts of that case as to warrant
the court in establishing an exception broad enough to cover
that case ?
Of course, absence of intention to defame and absence of
negligence, if both be assumed, do not per se furnish ground
for taking the case out of the general rule. Ex hypothesi, that
rule expressly declares that neither intent nor negligence is re-
quisite to liability. But it is conceivable that there may be special
circumstances which, when added to the absence of intent or
negligence, may justify the court in treating the case as an excep-
tion to which the general rule should not be applied.
What, if any, special circumstances exist in this case which
would justify the court in refusing to apply the general rule of
law.
Special grounds alleged in favor of immunity:
The charge was published in a newspaper of which the
defendants are proprietors.
This fact does not afford a defence. At common law there
is no distinction "between libellous matter in a newspaper and
libellous matter in any other documents, or between the pub-
lisher of the one and the publisher of the other, whether as
regards liability or immunity." The proprietors of newspapers
are not a special privileged class; they have no special privilege
as to the publication of defamatory statements.32
. Sir Frederick Pollock, however, while recognizing that there is now,
according to the English law, "an absolute right not to be defamed," says
of this right: "Perhaps it may be a fair subject of discussion whether it be
on the whole a beneficial one either at home or in British India."
Pollock, Law of Fraud in British India-Tagore Lectures, A. D. 1894,
page 23-
Bower, Code of Law of Actionable Defamation, 225, note (b); 437-
4,9; Barnes v. Campbell, 59 New Hampshire, 128. The defendants in Jones
v. Hulton do not occupy the position of a vendor of newspapers published
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There is, however, a newspaper case which tends to sustain
the defendant in Jones v. Hidton; viz., the case of Smith v.
Ashley,33 decided in Massachusetts, A. D. 1846. This was a
suit against the publisher of a newspaper for an alleged libellous
article written by a third person. It was held that if the pub-
lisher did not know that the article applied to the plaintiff, but
believed it to be a mere fancy sketch or fictitious story, he was
not liable; although the plaintiff might have been intended by the
writer of the article. The decision evidently proceeds upon the
theory, more prevalent sixty years.ago than now, that blame-
worthiness in the defendant is essential to the action. The idea
that there might be absolute liability irrespective of actual fault,
does not seem to have occurred to the court.
3 4
A more correct view as to the liability of a morally innocent
newspaper publisher was taken in Morrison v. Ritchie."5 Hus-
band and wife sued a newspaper publisher for printing under
"Notices of Births" a statement that the wife had just given
birth to twins. This was untrue, and the couple had then been
married less than two months. The publisher was not aware
of either fact. The notice was sent in, and paid for, as an
advertisement. At the bottom of the notice sent to the paper
was a name and address, which were subsequently found
to be fictitious. The notice was published in good faith and in
the ordinary way of business. No issue was framed for the
jury as to negligence. The publisher was held liable. Here, it
will be seen that the notice was ex facie harmless; and was in
reality defamatory by reason of facts unknown to the publisher,
but known to some of his readers. The court virtually held that
by other persons. If such a vendor, in the ordinary course of business,
sells a newspaper containing a libellous charge, he is exonerated if he proves
that he did not know the paper contained the libellous matter and that he
was not negligent in failing to acquire such knowledge. Emmons v. Pottle,
i6 Q. B. D. 354. But "such defence is not open to the author, printer, or
original publisher of the libel." Odgers on Libel and Slander, 5th ed., 166-
x67.
3 ii Metcalf, 367.
"In the first edition of Odgers on Libel and Slander, 387, the author
says as to this case of Smith v. Ashley: "Probably this would be a defence
in England in a criminal case; not, I apprehend, in any civil proceeding."
In the fifth edition of the same work (page 47) the author says as to this
case: Probably this would be a defence in England in a criminal case, if
not in a civil action." See also comments on Smith v. Ashley, in 159 Mass.,
p. 295 and p. 303.
'34 Scotch Session Cases, 5th Series, 645, A. D. i9o2.
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"ignorance of the defamatory nature of a statement is no defence,
and that he who knowingly makes any statement concerning
another must take the risk of that statement being in fact defama-
tory ;" and this is so held even though there be no negligence on
the defendant's part.
36
In both Morrison v. Ritchie and Jones v. Hdton the state-
ment was defamatory of the plaintiff solely because of facts
which were unknown to the defendants, and which an average
man in their place would hardly be said to be morally culpable
for not knowing. The two cases differ only as to the nature
of the facts unknown to the publishers. In Morrison v. Ritchie,
they were not aware of the date of the plaintiff's marriage or of
the fact that no birth had taken place. In Jones v. Hulton, they
were not aware of the existence of a person bearing a certain
name. In both cases, if the publishers had known the fact, they
would have understood the statement to be libellous.
Another reason urged for special immunity:
If defendants are held liable here, it follows that they might,
by the publication of a single document, make themselves liable
to separate suits by several distinct plaintiffs, having no connec-
tion with each other. Suppose, for instance, that there were
three men bearing the name of Artemus Jones, and that the
friends of each reasonably understood the publication as refer-
ring to the particular Artemus whom they happened to know.
Then, on the principles laid down by Lords Alverstone, Lore-
burn and Shaw, each of these three can maintain an action against
the defendants.
But what injustice is there in this result? If the defendants
have thus (without justification) damaged the reputation of
" See Salmond, Torts, Ist ed., 386-7; Odgers, Libel and Slander, 5th
ed., 7.
In the subsequent case of Wood v. Edinburgh Morning News, Scotch
Session Cases (igo), 895, the court held that the words in the case would
not bear the innuendo; and on this ground, whether rightly or wrongly,
distinguished the case from Morrison v. Ritchie. (See 22 Juridicial Review,
256-257; 23 Juridicial Review, 299-3oo.) Two judges in this later case said
that they reserved their opinion as to how far the publishers of a newspaper
could be made responsible, without averment of negligence, for publishing
an advertisement apparently innocent. See page 898, and compare 23 Juri-
dicial Review, 3oo. But I submit that the weight of both authority and rea-
son is in favor of regponsibility.
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three different persons, why should they not be compelled to make
compensation to each? 37
Another argument for special immunity might be as fol-
lows:
The writing in question was intended to be understood as
a purely imaginary sketch. A decision in favor of the plaintiff
would render it unsafe hereafter to print fancy sketches without
incurring unreasonable peril, and would thus deprive the reading
public of a source of innocent enjoyment.
But here, not only did the article purport to describe that
which the writer had himself seen and people whom he had him-
self observed; but furthermore: "The writer admitted that he
had intended to describe under a fictitious name people whom he
had seen." 32 ". . the writer of the libel has chosen to
state as a fact that Artemus Jones was present in order (as he
says) to avoid the banality of using A. B. or a blank; . . . "39
In other words, he purposely gave a name to one of his char-
acters in order to make his narrative more piquant and more
readable. If this motive does not, per se, furnish ground for
holding him liable; it certainly diminishes the force of his argu-
ment as to the hardship of imposing liability on one innocent of
intent to harm.
But suppose that the article was a purely imaginary sketch
and was intended to be so understood, does it follow that the
writer is to be exonerated when sensible readers reasonably un-
derstand it as describing actual occurrences and as naming real
persons? This interpretation would generally be easily avoided
if the writer explicitly stated that it was a mere fancy sketch and
that it related wholly to imaginary persons. Then, unless there
was good ground to believe that he was lying, the jury would be
unlikely to find that readers could and did reasonably understand
the articles to refer to a living person. The reason for not mak-
ing such an explicit statement is, undoubtedly, that it would
diminish the number of readers. But that does not furnish a
' No sufficient reason for immunity is given by Knowlton, J., in Hanson
v. Globe Newspaper Co., i59 Mass. 293, pp. 298, 299; or by Gray, J., in
Every Evening Printing Co. v. Butler, 144 Fed. Rep. q16, p. 921. See
Holmes, J., in 159 Mass., p. 3o5; and compare Farwell, L. J., in Jones v.
Hulton, pages 481, 482.
'Lord Alverstone, C. J., p. 455.
'Farwell, L. J., p. 48D.
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sufficient justification for causing actual damage to the reputation
of the plaintiff.
In this connection it may be further urged that the argu-
ment for the plaintiff carries too far; that, upon the foregoing
reasoning, the writer of a play or the author of a novel might be
held liable, merely because readers thought that a character was
intended for a certain actual person.
(i) It is conceivable (and there are well-known instances)
that a character in a professed work of fiction was actually in-
tended to be understood, and was understood, as describing a
living person. In such a case, if the description is defamatory,
there is, of course, no doubt as to liability.
40
(2) And I am inclined to think that liability should attach
if sensible readers of a novel could and did reasonably under-
stand a certain person to be described, even though the author did
not so intend. But (and this is a very important consideration)
much stronger proof would be required to satisfy a jury that
readers could reasonably understand a living person to be de-
scribed in a novel, than to satisfy them that such an interpreta-
tion could reasonably be given to a newspaper article purporting
to describe recent occurrences at a specified place and date. In a
play or a novel there is, practically speaking, a prima facie pre-
sumption that the characters are fictitious. but a newspaper is
generally understood to deal with actual facts and real persons.
41
Another argument urged in favor of special immunity:
It is conceded that a defendant is liable if, when "intending
to make an innocent statement concerning the plaintiff," he "makes
a libellous statement by mistake." But in that case the defendalt,
although entirely innocent of any intent to harm the plaintiff,
does intend "to involve the plaintiff in the act which he is doing.'
Whereas, in the present case of Jones v. Hulton, "the defendant
not only has no intent to harm the plaintiff, but, having never
heard of the plaintiff's existence, has no intent to do any act in
which the plaintiff shall be involved. Can such a state of mind
involve the defendant in liability to any action?
'4 2
'See Bower, 305; Odgers, 5th ed., 153.
41 See argument of counsel, page 449.
"The substance of this argument is forcibly stated in 58 Univ. Penna.
Law Review, 167, 168, in comments upon the decision of the Court of Appeal
in Jones v. Hulton.
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But the defendants must have been aware that, if there was
a living person bearing the name of Artemus Jones, this publica-
tion would be likely to be understood by some readers as applying
to him, and thus have the effect of damaging his reputation. And
the defendants must also have been aware that it was conceivable
that there might be a living person bearing that name. Who
should run the risk that there might be a real person, whose repu-
tation would thus be damnified? The innocent plaintiff, or the
defendants who saw fit to choose that name?
It may also be urged that no amount of care which could rea-
sonably be expected on the part of the defendants would have
enabled them to ascertain that there was such a person as Artemus
Jones; and that it was not to be expected that they would search
through all the directories and census returns.
But, if this be conceded, it does not follow that the defend-
ants did not run a risk of there being such a person. It only
follows that they were reasonable in believing the risk they ran
to be a very slight one. A jury might, perhaps, find that the
average man, in defendants' place, would have been reasonable
in believing it probable that there was no person bearing the
name of Artemus Jones. But the same jury might also find that,
if there was a person of that name, those readers who knew of
his existence might reasonably believe him to be the man de-
scribed by the defendants. The defendants' belief that their
article was not likely to do harm does not free them from lia-
bility for the harm which it actually did.4 3
Compare Jones v. HvIton with five other cases enumerated
earlier,44 where the fact that defendant was acting under an
honest mistake did not exonerate him. In four of these cases,
the defendant intended to speak of the specific individual who
afterwards brought suit. His mistake was in reference to the
construction or effect of his statement concerning that individual.
In the fifth case, his mistake was as to the identity of the person
"See the reference in Lord Loreburn's opinion, ante, p. 381, to the
established doctrine that one who publishes a defamatory statement in good
faith, with reasonable belief in its truth, is liable if, in fact, the statement
is false.
"Ante, pp. 372, 373; paragraphs 4, 5a, 5b, 5c and 6.
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charged; intending to make a true charge against another per-
son, he by mistake named the plaintiff. His mistake as to the
person charged was regarded as equally objectionable in law
with his mistake as to the nature of the charge.
The difference between these five cases and Jones v. Hulton
is that, in the former cases, the defendant intended to make a
statement about a living person; whereas, in Jones v. Hulton, he
mistakenly supposed that there was no living person to whom his
statement was applicable. He knew, however, that, if there was
such a living person, damage to such person was likely to result
from his statement. In all six cases, the defendant knew that
if he was mistaken, somebody would be likely to suffer damage.
In the first five cases, he may have had in mind the specific in-
dividual who might thus suffer. In Jones v. Hulton, he did not
have in his mind's eye a picture of the specific person who might
be harmed; but he knew that, if he was mistaken, then there was
such a person in existence somewhere.
Why should this difference make the defendant's conduct
any more justifiable than in the earlier cases? The precise nature
of the defendant's mistake does not affect the damage undergone
by the plaintiff. If the defendant is mistaken, the damage in
Jones v. Hulton is likely to be as great as in any of the five earlier
cases. And in all six cases alike, there was no duty, either legal
or moral, resting upon the defendant to publish the statement.
The special arguments advanced on behalf of these defend-
ants are largely based on the assumption that they are not liable
unless they were negligent. Whereas liability for defamation
does not depend upon the presence of wrong intention or negli-
gence on the part of the defendants. The law holds that one
who, in the absence of special justification, makes defamatory
statements, does so at his peril.
I think that the instructions given to the jury by Mr. Justice
Channell were correct; for the reasons given by Lords Alverstone
and Shaw (and in the main by Lord Loreburn); but not for the
reasons specially given by Lord justice Farwell.
Jeremiah Smith.
Cambridge, Mass.
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APPENDIX.
While the manuscript of the above article was in the hands
of the Editors of this Review, the following report of a French
case appeared in a London newspaper, "The Law Times," of Jan.
13, 1912; Vol. 132, page 246:
"The posthumous romande of Jules Verne, entitled Le Pilote du
Danube, is at present before the Third Chamber of the Civil Tribu-
nal in Paris in circumstances which in themselves almost read as a
romance, and, moreover, recall a case recently decided in our courts.
The book was published by the firm of Hetzel, who received the
manuscript from M. Michel Jules Verne, the son of the author of the
Tour du Monde en Quatre-vingts Jours. One of the characters in the
story is Jackel Semo, who is no other than a redoubtable bandit. At
Routschouk in Bulgaria resides one M. Jackel Semo, who objects to
his name being given in a romance to one whose only occupation is
piraterie, seeing that the actual Jackel Semo is a reputable commission
agent. He alleges that the publication of the book has caused him un
prejudice considerable, so he has brought an action against M. Michel
Jules Verne and Hetzel claiming 5o,ooo francs (12ooo) as
dommnages-intgr~ts. The circumstances under which the demandeur
appeared in the book are these: As far back as 1898 M. Michel Jules
Verne went for a tour down the Danube. On board the steamboat
he made the acquaintance of an agreeable passenger, and when the
steamer reached its destination the two travelers, as is the case in
such circumstances, exchanged cards on the off chance of their ever
meeting again, or wishing to communicate with one another. The
probability is that they would never have met again but for unseen
circumstances, and certainly neither at parting dreamed that their
rendezvous would be the court on the Seine. On his return, M.
Michel Jules Verne came across the card, and his description of
what he had seen inspired the author of Cinq Semaines en Ballon
with the idea of writing a new story. The card bore the name
Jackel Semo, with the owner's occupation and address at Routschouk.
How Jules Verne came across the card, or how he happened to
make his brigand a native of Routschouk, is not explained, nor does
M. Jackel Semo assert that he is the only person bearing that name
in Bulgaria. The case for M. Jackel Semo was pleaded by Me.
Venfeld, while Mes. Raymond Poincar6 and Droz urged for the
difendeurs that the deinandeur had suffered no prejudice vrateriel
or moral. They further pleaded that as soon as their attention had
been called to the matter, a new edition of the Pilote du Danube
was printed, the name of Jackel Semo being withdrawn and replaced
by that of Yacoub Ogul. The court reserved judgment, and con-
formably to the conclusions of the substitut Piedeli~vre, the Tribu-
nal gave judgment on Wednesday last dismissing the claim of M.
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Jackel Semo. MM. Hetzel and Michel Jules Verne were each
awarded one franc, which they had claimed par voie de conclusions
reconventionnelles."
In one respect the above is a stronger case for the plaintiff
than Jones v. Hulton. Both the Messrs. Verne knew that there
was (or had lately been) a person, living in the vicinity described,
who bore the same name as the character in the story.
In two other respects, however, the case for the plaintiff is
weaker than Jones v. Hulton.
(I) As to the nature of the publication in which the defama-
tory statement appeared;
(2) As to the nature of the defamatory statement itself.
As to (I) : In Jones v. Hulton the statement was made in a
newspaper article; purporting to describe facts recently occurring
at a specified place and date. In the French case the statements
were made in a novel ("a romance") ; purporting to be a work of
fiction, and not a description of actual facts. As to a novel,
there would be, practically speaking, a prima facie presumption
that the characters were fictitious. (On this point I quote the fol-
lowing language of a legal friend):
"What purports to be fiction is naturally to be taken as fiction
and a reader cannot reasonably interpret it, contrary to its pur-
port, as fact, unless there are some circumstances which justify
such an interpretation. Of course, we all know cases where such
an interpretation would be reasonable ('Cape Cod Folks,' for ex-
ample, and Winston Churchill's books) but in each case it is the
proof of additional facts which give him the warrant for so inter-
preting it. There must be something to justify him in translating
into fact what is given out as fiction. It is not easy for me to see
how a mere name can do this. The natural meaning of the coin-
cidence of names without more is simply that the writer has bor-
rowed the name to give to a fictitious character. This may be
bad taste and may be annoying to the owner of the name, but
that is quite a different matter from making statements about that
person. It seems to me, therefore, that the decision in the French
case was right, and that M. Jackel Semo's case really reduces it-
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self to a claim that he has been wronged in the borrowing of his
name, i. e., asserting in fact a kind of property in the name."
As to (2) : A jury would be very slow to find that sensible
readers understood (or could reasonably have understood) that
the description of "a redoubtable bandit" applied to the plaintiff,
who had hitherto been known as "a reputable commission agent."
As between a charge of unchastity and a charge of conspicuous
brigandage, each made against a person of the same name, the
latter charge would be less likely to be understood as applying to
a hitherto reputable person of that name than the former charge
would be.
J.S.
